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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of uncertainty on long-run growth in two
model economies, where households fund risky investment projects
of entrepreneurs in the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections.
Imperfections in the ﬁrst model are due to asymmetric information
which is resolved through costly state veriﬁcation. In this case, some
entrepreneurs may decide at the outset not to borrow and not to run
projects. Imperfections in the second model are due to incomplete
enforceability of loan contracts. In this case, all entrepreneurs are
willing to borrow, but some of them may choose not to run projects,
preferring to abscond with their loans, instead. We show that, in
both cases, an increase in uncertainty increases the rate of interest on
loans which increases the number of entrepreneurs who abstain from
running projects. This reduces capital accumulation and growth. We
also show that ﬁnancial market frictions have similar eﬀects, and that
the eﬀects of uncertainty disappear when these frictions are absent.
1 Introduction
There is a strong presumption that the growth of an economy depends impor-
tantly on the risks, or uncertainties, that pervade individual decision mak-
ing. From uncertainty about incomes to uncertainty about lifetimes, the
probabilistic nature of the economic environment can have signiﬁcant im-
plications for the incentives and opportunities of individuals to engage in
growth-promoting activities, such as investment, invention and innovation.
The precise way in which uncertainty may impact on growth has already been
∗The authors are grateful for the ﬁnancial support of the ESRC. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1studied in a number of analyses. In this paper we identify another possible
channel that has not, to our knowledge, been fully revealed before.
Early interest in the relationship between growth and uncertainty can be
found in much of the pioneering work on optimal savings and investment
behaviour in stochastic maximising models (e.g., Brock and Mirman 1972;
Levhari and Srinivasan 1969; Mirman 1971; and Rothschild and Stiglitz 1971;
Sandmo 1970). Amongst other results, this research revealed how an increase
in uncertainty about incomes could have ambiguous eﬀects on capital accu-
mulation depending on individuals’ attitudes towards risk. These attitudes
-r e ﬂected in the curvature of the utility function - determine the extent to
which individuals’ decisions are dominated by precautionary motives which
induce agents to save more in times of greater uncertainty.1 T h es a m ec o n c l u -
sion has been reached in more recent analyses based on stochastic endogenous
growth models. Examples include Smith (1996), who considers an overlap-
ping generations economy with shocks to productivity, and de Hek (1999),
who adopts a representative agent framework with random returns to knowl-
edge accumulation. In both cases an increase in uncertainty - measured as
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the shock - is more likely to
raise (reduce) long-run growth the higher( l o w e r )i st h ed e g r e eo fr e l a t i v er i s k
aversion, or, equivalently, the lower (higher) is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Other recent investigations have associated uncertainty with a
more aggregative measure of volatility (e.g., the variance of output growth)
which has been shown to have a positive or negative eﬀect on average output
growth depending on the underlying mechanism of technological change and
the underlying source of stochastic ﬂuctuations (e.g., Aghion and Saint-Paul
1998a, 1998b; Blackburn and Galindev 2003; Blackburn and Pelloni 2004;
Martin and Rogers 1997, 2000). This body of research includes several em-
pirical studies, the most recent of which suggest that the relationship between
growth and volatility is negative (e.g., Kneller and Young, 2001; Martin and
Rogers, 2000; Ramey and Ramey, 1995).2
Our particular interest in this paper is the way in which uncertainty may
1On the other hand, greater uncertainty about the returns on savings may cause savings
to fall. From a diﬀerent perspective, it has also been shown how greater uncertainty about
the returns on investment projects may deter ﬁrms from investing due to irreversibility
eﬀects (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
2Strictly speaking, volatility and uncertainty are two diﬀerent concepts that refer to
two diﬀerent phenomena: by the former is meant ﬂuctuations in a variable, while by
the latter is meant unpredictability of these ﬂuctuations. Of course, to the extent that
the two phenomena usually go hand-in-hand, it is common practice to use the concepts
interchangeably. In some models (e.g., Aizenman and Marion 1993; Hopenhayn and Mu-
niagurria 1996) the source of uncertainty is volatility of government policy, rather than
shocks to technology or preferences.
2impact on growth as a result of ﬁnancial market imperfections. There is now
a substantial volume of research devoted towards understanding and veri-
fying the existence of linkages between the real and ﬁnancial development
of economies.3 Broadly speaking, this research shows how improvements in
ﬁnancial arrangements between borrowers and lenders can foster economic
growth by expanding the opportunities for channelling a larger fraction of
savings into investment and for undertaking more productive types of in-
vestment.4 These opportunities may arise in a number of ways, including
a greater a pooling of risks, a higher quality of information, a lower cost
of monitoring and a lower cost of transactions. That such possibilities exist
must be a consequence of the ineﬃcient functioning of the ﬁnancial system to
begin with. To many observers, it is precisely the misallocation of resources
due to ﬁnancial market imperfections that poses one of the greatest obsta-
cles to real economic development.5 In the analysis that follows we show how
such imperfections can also provide scope for uncertainty to aﬀect long-run
growth.
The basic framework that we use for our analysis describes an overlapping
generations economy in which homogeneous households (lenders) fund risky
investment projects of heterogeneous entrepreneurs (borrowers) by drawing
up mutually-agreeable loan contracts. The outcome of a project is capital
and the accumulation of capital is the engine of growth in the economy. Con-
tracts are entered into prior to the realisation of project outcomes, implying
uncertainty for both lenders and borrowers. Acceptance of a contract entails
a commitment by a household to make a loan out of its current income and
an obligation by an entrepreneur to repay this loan out of the future pro-
ceeds from capital production. The amount of loan repayment is given by
the predetermined contractual interest rate.
Against the above background, we study the eﬀects of uncertainty on
growth in two distinct, but related, models of ﬁnancial market imperfections.
The ﬁrst model is one in which imperfections arise due to asymmetric infor-
mation between borrowers and lenders: only the former can directly observe
the outcomes of projects, while the latter must spend resources on acquir-
ing such information. This raises the possibility that a borrower may try to
3Both theoretically and empirically, this research has grown extensively over the past
decade. Rather than single out just a few contributions, we refer the reader to the surveys
of Capasso (2004), Driﬃll (2003) and Levine (1997).
4At the same time, since wealthier economies are more able to aﬀord the costs of making
such improvements, then ﬁnancial development may not only inﬂuences, but may also be
inﬂuenced by, the level of real development.
5This view was espoused most forcefully in the early contributions of McKinnon (1973)
and Shaw (1973).
3avoid honouring his debt obligations by claiming falsely that he is bankrupt.
The solution to this problem entails costly state veriﬁcation on the part of
lenders (e.g., Diamond 1984; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Townsend 1979). In
this model some entrepreneurs may choose at the outset not to take on loans
and not to run projects. The second model is one in which imperfections
arise because of lack of enforceability of loan contracts: borrowers have an
opportunity of reneging on debt payments by simply absconding with their
loans (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1993; Blackburn and Bose 2002; Galor
and Zeira 1993). Doing so means that these funds must be consumed, rather
than invested in capital production. In this model all entrepreneurs choose
to take on loans but not all of them choose to run projects.6
We show that, in both models, an increase in uncertainty about project
outcomes leads to an increase in the contractual interest rate and an increase
in the number of entrepreneurs who abstain from running projects. Capital
accumulation and growth are reduced as a result. We also show that, in
both models, an increase in the extent of ﬁnancial market frictions has simi-
lar eﬀects, and that the eﬀects of uncertainty disappear when such frictions
are absent. These ﬁndings may be related to the contrasting experiences of
economies that diﬀer in their exposure to uncertainty and their vulnerabil-
ity to ineﬃciencies. Such diﬀerences are most notable between developed
and developing countries, the latter of which display much greater levels of
volatility and much lower levels of eﬃcient ﬁnance. Our analysis indicates
how these features may well impair growth prospects and how they may help
to explain cross-country diﬀerences in per capita incomes.
In Section 2 we describe the general environment in which economic ac-
tivity takes place. Section 3 presents the model of asymmetric information,
while Section 4 contains the model of imperfect enforcement. Concluding
remarks are contained in Section 5.
2T h e B a s i c S e t - u p
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,...,∞. There is a countable inﬁ-
nite number of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations
of dynastic families. Each generation is divided at birth into two groups of
6We note that, in practice, both asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement
(together with other types of ﬁnancial market imperfection) may well co-exist. This is a
feature of the static partial equilibrium models of Agenor and Aizenman (1998a,b) and
Aizenman and Powell (2003), on which our dynamic general equilibrium analysis builds.
We study the two types of imperfection separately because of diﬀerences in other modelling
aspects to which they give rise.
4market participants - households (or lenders) and entrepreneurs (or borrow-
ers). To ﬁx ideas, we normalise the total population to 2, assume equal sized
groups of mass 1 and unite newly-born lenders with newly-born borrowers in
randomly-matched pairs.7 All agents are risk neutral, deriving linear utility
from their old-age consumption of ﬁnal output. Output is produced by a
unit mass of ﬁrms using labour (hired from households) and capital (rented
from entrepreneurs). One unit of labour is supplied by each young household,
while varying amounts of capital are provided by old entrepreneurs. Capi-
tal production entails the operation of a risky project when an entrepreneur
is young and without any means of self-ﬁnance. For a project to be taken
on, an entrepreneur must acquire a loan from a household with a promise
to repay this loan in the future under the terms set by a non-renogotiable
ﬁnancial contract. We begin to formalise this environment with reference to
the circumstances surrounding agents of generation t.
The representative ﬁrm engaged in ﬁnal manufacturing combines nt units




t ,A > 0,α∈ (0,1). (1)
where Kt denotes the aggregate stock of capital.8 Labour is hired at the
competitively-determined wage rate wt, while capital is rented at the










t . In equilibrium, where nt =1
and kt = Kt, these conditions become
wt = αAkt, (2)
rt = r =( 1− α)A. (3)
An entrepreneur who undertakes a risky project is able to produce κt+1
units of capital with lt units of loans in accordance with
κt+1 = B(1 + βt)lt,B > 0. (4)
The term βt is a random variable, the value of which is realised by an entre-
preneur subsequent to the acquisition of a loan. For simplicity, we assume
7The assumption of a one-to-one matching between lenders and borrowers is a con-
venient abstraction that has been exploited by others (e.g., Bencivenga and Smith 1993;
Blackburn et al. 2005; Bose and Cothren 1997). It may be justiﬁe db ya p p e a l i n gt ot h e
existence of search costs which prohibit the break-up of any initial lender-borrower pairing.
The model could be reformulated without the assumption to obtain the same results as
those derived below.
8Thus we allow for an aggregate externality in the production of goods, as in many
types of endogenous growth model (e.g., Romer (1986)).
5that βt is uniformly distributed over the interval [−b,b] with probability den-
sity function f(βt)= 1
2b (b<1). On completion of a project, the entrepreneur
e a r n sa ni n c o m eo frκt+1 by renting his capital to ﬁnal goods producers. Out
of this income, he is obliged to repay the loan that was used to ﬁnance the
project to begin with. Denoting by Rt+1 the rate of interest on loans, the
amount of loan repayment is (1 + Rt+1)lt. An entrepreneur who makes this
r e p a y m e n ti sl e f tw i t han e ti n c o m eo frB(1 + βt)lt − (1 + Rt+1)lt.A t t h e
same time, capital market imperfections provide an opportunity for borrow-
ers to avoid honouring their debt obligations. The precise nature of these
imperfections is speciﬁed later.
Each young household earns a wage income of wt from supplying its unit
labour endowment to ﬁnal goods ﬁrms. In addition to ﬁn a n c i n gar i s k y
project, a household can save its income safely by accessing its own storage
technology that converts one unit of output at time t into 1+ρ (ρ>0) units
of output at time t+1 . This technology functions as a type of riskless asset
that pays a ﬁxed rate of return with certainty. Like entrepreneurs, households
are uninformed about the outcomes of projects until loans have been made
and values of βt have been realised. Prior to these events, households set
the interest rate on loans, subject to their uncertainty and subject to the
frictions in the capital market.
An equilibrium loan contract is a ﬁnancial arrangement between an en-
trepreneur and a household that allows borrowing and lending to take place
on mutually-agreeable terms. These terms are such as to maximise the entre-
preneur’s expected utility, subject to the household’s individual rationality
(participation) constraint. This constraint states that the household’s ex-
pected income from lending is no less than its certain income from storage.
In equilibrium the constraint holds with equality.
Our primary interest is in the eﬀects of uncertainty, or volatility, on
growth through changes in the ﬁnancial arrangements between agents. An
increase in uncertainty is measured by a mean-preserving spread of βt.T h i s
corresponds simply to an increase in the bounds on this variable, as deter-
mined by the distributional support parameter b. We shall also be interested
in the extent to which growth is aﬀected by capital market imperfections, a
precise measure of which will be given subsequently. Both the interpretation
of βt and the nature of ﬁnancial frictions are diﬀerent in the two models that
we consider. These diﬀerences, together with other features, are reﬂected
in diﬀerent propagation mechanisms through which market uncertainty and
market imperfections impact on growth. We now present each model in turn.
63 Model I: Project Financing With Asym-
metric Information
The ﬁrst scenario that we consider is one in which βt represents a technology
shock that is identically and independently distributed across entrepreneurs.
Information is symmetric ex ante in the sense that, prior to drawing up
loan contracts, all agents are equally uninformed about the realisations of
this shock. By contrast, information is asymmetric ex post in the sense
that, subsequent to agreeing on loan contracts, only entrepreneurs are able
to directly observe the shock. This informational asymmetry is the source
of ﬁnancial market imperfections. The implication is that an entrepreneur
may try to default on his loan repayment by claiming falsely that he is
bankrupt due to a bad realisation of βt. The solution to this problem involves
costly state veriﬁcation, whereby a lender spends resources on investigating
a borrower whenever bankruptcy is declared with the view to observing and
claiming all of the borrower’s income (e.g., Diamond 1984; Gale and Hellwig
1985; Townsend 1979).9 It is plausible to imagine that more resources must
be spent in the case of larger scale operations and more complicated projects.
For the purposes of the present analysis, we capture this conveniently by
making the simple assumption that the cost of veriﬁcation is clt (c>0),
being proportional to size of the loan (e.g., Azariadis and Chakraborty 1999).
A measure of the extent of capital market imperfections (i.e., the cost to
lenders of aquiring information) is then given by c. Similarly, we assume
that the operation of a project requires entrepreneurial eﬀort of  lt ( >0),
being also proportional to the size of the project and yielding linear disutility.
Entrepreneurs are diﬀerentiated according to diﬀerences in   which we assume




x h(·)d  = z−x
e provides a measure of
entrepreneurs for whom   ∈ (x,z). Depending on the value of  ,w h i c hi s
public information, an entrepreneur decides whether or not to produce capital
by taking on a loan and running a project. If not, then the entrepreneur
remains inactive and receives zero payoﬀ.
9As in some other analyses (e.g., Agenor and Aizenman 1998a,b; Aizenman and Powell
2003; Gertler and Gilchrist 1993), one could also think of lenders as incurring costs of
contract enforcement in the sense of having to spend resources (such as legal fees) on seizing
the incomes (and any collateral) of bankrupt borrowers. We study contract enforcement
from a diﬀerent perspective in the second of our models.
73.1 Equilibrium Loan Contracts
Given the above, we may write the utility of a non-bankrupt capital producer
as
ut = rB(1 + βt)lt − (1 + Rt+1)lt −  lt, (5)
and the utility of a bankrupt capital producer as
ut = − lt. (6)
A borrower realises the value of βt subsequent to his acquisition of a loan.
The borrower is bankrupt whenever rB(1 + βt) < 1+Rt+1.W e m a y i n f e r
from this that, for any given Rt+1, there is a critical value of βt below which
bankruptcy occurs and above which bankruptcy does not occur. This is the
value b βt that satisﬁes
rB(1 + b βt)=1+Rt+1. (7)
Naturally, b βt is increasing in Rt+1: ceteris paribus, the higher is the interest
r a t eo nl o a n s ,t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v em u s tb eab o r r o w e ri fh ei st ob ea b l e
to make his loan repayment. The ex post utility of a borrower is therefore
given by either (5) or (6) depending on whether βt ∈ [b βt,b] or βt ∈ [−b,b βt).
It follows that, prior to observing βt, an entrepreneur’s expected utility from




[rB(1 + βt)lt − (1 + Rt+1)lt]f(βt)dβt −  lt. (8)
A project will be taken on by the entrepreneur if the above expression is
non-negative.
Households make loans in the knowledge that borrowers may declare
bankruptcy. If so, then the borrowers’ claims are veriﬁed and households
appropriate all of the proceeds from capital production, less the costs of ver-
iﬁcation. Bankruptcy is declared only if βt ∈ [−b,b βt), in which case a house-
hold’s return per unit of loan is rB(1 + βt) − c. Alternatively, if βt ∈ [b βt,b],
then the household is paid back i nf u l l ,e a r n i n gar e t u r no f1+Rt+1 per unit
of loan. As indicated earlier, an equilibrium loan contract is one in which,
prior to the realisation of βt, a household’s expected return from lending is




(1 + Rt+1)f(βt)dβt +
Z b βt
−b
[rB(1 + βt) − c]f(βt)dβt (9)
For any given b βt, this expression determines the contractual interest rate,
Rt+1.




rB (1 + βt)ltf(βt)dβt −
Z b βt
−b





b βt + b
2b
!
c − (1 + ρ) −  
#
lt. (10)
Accordingly, the condition for an entrepreneur to take on a loan and run a





c−(1+ρ) ≥  .T h i sd e ﬁnes a
critical value of  ,d e n o t e db  ,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes
b   = rB −
Ã
b βt + b
2b
!
c − (1 + ρ). (11)
Capital production is undertaken by any entrepreneur for whom   ∈ [0,b  ],
and is not undertaken by any entrepreneur for whom   ∈ (b  ,e].T h e t o t a l
population of capital producers is therefore
R b  
0 h( )d  = b  
e.10 The expression





c, the expected veriﬁ-
cation cost per unit of loan, which is passed on by lenders to borrowers. This
cost is higher the higher is c (meaning that more resources must be spent in
the event of veriﬁcation) and the higher is b βt (meaning that veriﬁcation is
more likely). An increase in either of these terms will therefore reduce the
population of capital producers.
Subtraction of (9) from (7) yields
Rt+1 − ρ =
Z b βt
−b
[rB(1 + b βt) − rB(1 + βt)+c]f(βt)dβt (12)
This expression may be interpreted as showing the interest rate spread be-
tween risky and riskless assets. The size of spread depends on how much
a lender expects to lose when a borrower goes bankrupt and is unable to
make his full loan repayment (i.e., when βt ∈ [−b,b βt)). To be sure, observe
f r o m( 7 )t h a tt h eﬁrst integral term on the right-hand-side of (12) is equal to
R b βt
−b(1+Rt+1)f(·)dβt which measures the expected amount of non-repayment
10Ifb  <0 (b  >e ), then no (every) entrepreneur produces capital. Whilst this is perfectly
feasible, it is possible to rule out such an outcome by imposing appropriate restrictions
on parameter values. This follows from the fact that the lowest (highest) value of b   is
rB − c − (1 + ρ) (rB − (1 + ρ)), corresponding to the case in which b βt = b (b βt = −b). It
turns out that   ≥ 0 by virtue of the restriction rB − c − (1 + ρ) ≥ 0 that we appeal to
later in solving the optimal contracting problem.
9per unit of loan as a result of bankruptcy. Conversely, the second and third
integral terms on the right-hand-side of (12) give the expected amount of
income per unit of loan that is claimed from a bankrupt borrower, net of ver-
iﬁcation costs. Accordingly, (12) implies that the contractual interest rate
on loans is set as a simple mark-up over lenders’ safe return from storage,
where the size of mark-up is equal to the expected net income lost due to
bankruptcy. This mark-up rule may be simpliﬁed to
Rt+1 = ρ +








As above, there is a positive relationship between Rt+1 and b βt: ceteris paribus,
lenders set a higher contractual interest rate the more likely it is that bank-
ruptcy will occur.
The expressions in (7) and (12) deﬁne two independent relationships be-
tween Rt+1 and b βt. Together, these relationships form a simultaneous system,
the solution to which is unique and feasible under the parameter restriction
1+ρ + c<r B<
1+ρ


















c ≡ R(b,c). (15)
From (11), we also have
b  





c − (1 + ρ) ≡  (b,c). (16)
The two key parameters in the model are b and c.T h e f o r m e r , w h i c h
determines the spread of the distribution of βt, provides a measure of un-
certainty. The latter, which is the cost of veriﬁcation per unit of loan, acts
as an indicator of capital market frictions. The result in (14) implies that
βb(·) > 0 and βc(·) > 0. The result in (15) reveals similarly that Rb(·) > 0
and Rc(·) > 0.A n dt h er e s u l ti n( 1 6 )s h o w st h a t b(·) < 0 and  c(·) < 0.I n
words, the greater is the degree of uncertainty and/or the greater is the extent
of capital market imperfections, the higher is a borrower’s chances of going
bankrupt, the higher is the interest rate on loans and the lower is the number
of entrepreneurs who take on loans. The eﬀects of uncertainty are due to the
fact that the loan repayment is a non-linear (speciﬁcally, concave) function
11Details of the derivations can be found in Appendix A.
10of βt. To be sure, recall that the repayment (per unit of loan) is rB(1+βt) if
βt ∈ [−b,b β
∗
),a n d1+R∗ if βt ∈ [b β
∗
,b]. The expected repayment is therefore
reduced by a mean-preserving spread of βt. Lenders compensate for this by
charging a higher interest rate on loans which increases the likelihood that
bankruptcy will occur and so raises the expected veriﬁcation cost. Since this
reduces the expected proﬁts from capital production, fewer entrepreneurs
have an incentive to engage in this activity. The eﬀects of ﬁnancial market
imperfections operate in a similar way. An increase in c increases the ex-
pected veriﬁcation cost which raises the contractual interest rate and makes
bankruptcy more likely. Faced with lower expected returns from borrowing,
fewer entrepreneurs ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et ot a k eo nl o a n s .
It is instructive to consider what outcomes would transpire in an envi-
ronment of perfect capital markets. This is the case in which c =0 , meaning
that lenders are able to costlessly verify the bankruptcy claims of borrowers.
Under such circumstances, the expression in (16) becomes independent of
b, implying that the degree of uncertainty is irrelevant for entrepreneurial
decisions about whether or not to take on loans: the number of entrepre-
neurs who do take on loans is simply ﬁxed. It is straightforward to verify
that, compared to the above, the equilibrium values of Rt+1 and b βt are lower,
while the equilibrium value of   is higher.
3.2 Growth
The foregoing analysis reveals how certain aspects of borrowing and lending
are inﬂuenced by conditions of uncertainty and costly state veriﬁcation in
ﬁnancial markets. In general, the greater is the degree of uncertainty and/or
the more costly is veriﬁcation, the higher is the interest rate on borrowing
and the fewer is the number of borrowers. In what follows we study the
implications of these results for capital accumulation and growth.
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs who choose to take on loans and run
projects. These are entrepreneurs for whom   ∈ [0,b  
∗]. The expected amount
of capital produced by each of them is given from (4) as E(κt+1)=
R b
−bB(1+
βt)ltf(βt)dβt = Blt.S i n c e βt is identically and independently distributed
across projects, we may appeal to the law of large numbers to deduce an
expression for the total amount of capital produced from all projects: that is
kt+1 =
R b  ∗





lt. The size of loan to each capital producer is
equal to the wage of the houshehold with which he is paired. Thus lt = wt,
where wt is determined according to (2). It follows that the process governing






∗kt. Given this, then the
11equilibrium growth rate of capital, g∗ =
kt+1







 (b,c)=g(b,c).( 1 7 )
The result in (17) implies that gb(·) < 0 and gc(·) < 0: growth is reduced
by an increase in the degree of uncertainty and/or an increase in the costs
of veriﬁcation. As we have seen, each of these events leads to a higher
contractual interest rate, a higher expected veriﬁcation cost and a lower
number of entrepreneurs who run projects. With fewer capital producers,
capital production is reduced and, with it, so too is growth.12
In the absence of ﬁnancial market frictions (c =0 ), growth is unaﬀected
by uncertainty. This follows from our earlier result that, when veriﬁcation
is costless, b  
∗ is independent of b, implying that uncertainty is irrelevant for
an entrepreneur’s decision about whether or not to run a project. Compared
to the case in which veriﬁcation is costly, there is a greater number capital
producers which is reﬂected in a higher growth rate of capital.
4 Model II: Project Financing With Imper-
fect Enforcement
The second scenario that we consider is one in which βt represents an idio-
syncratic characteristic - the technical proﬁciency or human capital - of an
entrepreneur with which he is randomly endowed at birth. That is, we assume
that entrepreneurs are diﬀerentiated according to their technical capabilities
(skills, expertise and knowledge) and are distributed according to the dis-
tribution of βt.T h u s
R z
x f(·)dβt = z−x
2b provides a measure of entrepreneurs
with βt ∈ (x,z). Information is symmetric both ex ante and ex post in the
sense that all agents - borrowers and lenders - are equally informed (unin-
formed) about the realisations of βt after (before) loans have been made. The
source of capital market imperfections is a weakness in the enforceability of
loan contracts, implying the possibility that debt payments may be reneged
upon. Speciﬁcally, we imagine that a borrower has an opportunity to abscond
with his loan and default on his debt payment by ﬂeeing from his current
location and consuming his illegal income in hiding elsewhere (e.g., Banerjee
12The eﬀect of veriﬁcation costs on growth is also studied by Azariadis and Chakraborty
(1999) in a similar model to ours. In their case, however, the eﬀect hinges on the assump-
tion that lenders make provision for these costs in advance of giving loans to entreprenurs,
all of whom run projects. An increase in costs reduces capital accumulation by reducing
the total amount of loans available.
12and Newman 1993; Blackburn and Bose 2002; Galor and Zeira 1993). We
suppose that a borrower is able to do this only by foregoing capital pro-
duction (which we treat as being essentially immobile or prohibitively costly
to re-locate) and, instead, operating a storage technology that converts one
unit of output (i.e., loans) at time t into B0(1 + βt) (B0 > 0) units of out-
put at time t +1 . For simplicity, we assume that both activities require the
same amount of entrepreneurial eﬀort which we normalise to zero. By way
of simplifying the analysis further and making it comparable to the previ-
ous framework, we also assume that capital production and storage deliver
the same expected yield of consumable income, rB = B0. A borrower who
defaults faces a probability, p ∈ (0,1), of evading detection and a probabil-
ity, 1 − p, of being apprehended. In the event of the former, the borrower
retains the full amount of B0(1 + βt)lt as income, leaving his creditors with
nothing. In the event of the latter, the borrower earns zero income, having
all of B0(1 + βt)lt seized by his creditors as the maximum punishment for
his misdemeaner. A measure of the extent of capital market frictions (i.e.,
imperfect contract enforceability) is given by p.13
4.1 Equilibrium Loan Contracts
Given the above, we may write entrepreneurial utility in the case of non-
defaulting as
ut = rB(1 + βt)lt − (1 + Rt+1)lt, (18)
and entrepreneurial utility in the case of defaulting as
ut =
½
rB(1 + βt)lt, with prob. p,
0, with prob. 1 − p. (19)
As before, an entrepreneur realises the value of βt subsequent to his acquisi-
tion of a loan. Once this realisation occurs, the entrepreneur chooses whether
or not to default on the loan. The condition for an entrepreneur to default
is that his expected utility from doing so is no less than his expected util-
ity from not doing so. From (18) and (19), this condition is established as
13Other authors have studied imperfect enforcement in terms of lenders’ potential to
seize borrowers’ incomes in the event of going bankrupt on projects (e.g., Agenor and
Aizenman 1998a,b; Aizenman and Powell 2003). Speciﬁcally, a lender is able to seize only
af r a c t i o n ,x ∈ (0,1), of a borrower’s income and must incur a cost, z,o fd o i n gt h i s .
In our case imperfect enforcement refers to the opportunity for a borrower to take ﬂight
with his loan and not to actually run any project. For simplicity, we set x =1(since
the possibility of unrecouped defaulter income is already captured by p, the probability of
successful default) and z =0(since the cost of recoupment can be analysed in much the
same way as the cost of veriﬁcation that we studied in the previous model).
13prB(1+βt) ≥ rB(1+βt)−(1+Rt+1),o r(1−p)rB(1+βt) ≤ 1+Rt+1.W e
may deduce from this that, for any given Rt+1, there is a maximum (critical)
value of βt below which defaulting occurs and above which defaulting does
not occur. This is the value b βt that satisﬁes
(1 − p)rB(1 + b βt)=1+Rt+1. (20)
Evidently, b βt is increasing in Rt+1: ceteris paribus, an entrepreneur is more
likely to default the higher is the interest on loans that he would otherwise





w h i c hi se q u a lt ot h em a s so fe n t r e p r e n e u r sw h oa c t u a l l yd od e f a u l t . Ex
post, the income from borrowing is either (18) or (19) depending on whether
βt ∈ (b βt,b] or βt ∈ [−b,b βt].14 It follows that, prior to observing βt,a n








rB(1 + βt)ltf(βt)dβt. (21)
The entrepreneur will take on a loan if the above expression is non-negative.
A household that lends makes contingent claims on the two alternative
income streams of an entrepreneur - that is, the income from capital pro-
duction if the entrepreneur does not default, and the income from illegal
storage if the entrepreneur defaults but is caught. In the case of the former,
βt ∈ (b βt,b] and the return per unit of loan is 1+Rt+1. In the case of the latter,
βt ∈ [−b,b βt] and the (expected) return per unit of loan is (1−p)rB(1+βt).
As in the previous model, an equilibrium loan contract is one in which, prior
to the realisation of βt, a household’s expected return from lending is equal




(1 + Rt+1)f(βt)dβt +( 1− p)
Z b βt
−b
rB(1 + βt)f(βt)dβt. (22)
For any given b βt, this expression determines the contractual interest rate,
Rt+1.
14Note that an entrepreneur would always default before he would allow himself to go
bankrupt on a project. As in the previous model, bankruptcy occurs if rB(1 + βt) <
1+Rt+1,o ri fβt < b βt,w h e r eb βt satisﬁes (7). Under such circumstances, the entrepreneur
cedes the entire amount rB(1 + βt) to his creditors. But since the value of b βt in (7) is
lower than the value of b βt in (20), any realisation of βt that is less than the latter will
cause the entrepreneur to default, irrespective of whether he is bankrupt.




rB(1 + βt)ltf(·)dβt − (1 + ρ)lt
=[ rB − (1 + ρ)]lt (23)
Thus, assuming that rB > 1+ρ, an entrepreneur will always want to borrow.
Subtraction of (22) from (20) yields
Rt+1 − ρ =
Z b βt
−b
[(1 − p)rB(1 + b βt) − (1 − p)rB(1 + βt)]f(βt)dβt (24)
Like before, this expression may be interpreted as showing the interest rate
spread between risky and riskless assets. In the present model, the size
of spread depends on how much a lender expects to lose when a borrower
reneges on his debt obligation (i.e., when βt ∈ [−b,b βt]). To see this, observe
from (20) that the ﬁrst integral term on the right-hand-side of (24) is equal
to
R b βt
−b(1 + Rt+1)f(·)dβt which measures the expected amount of repayment
per unit of loan that goes missing through reneging. Conversely, the second
integral term on the right-hand-side of (24) gives the expected amount of
income per unit of loan that is extracted from a reneger who is caught.
Accordingly, (24) implies that the contractual interest rate on loans is set as
a simple mark-up over lenders’ safe return from storage, where the size of
mark-up is equal to the expected net income lost due to defaulting. A more
precise expression for this mark-up rule is
Rt+1 = ρ +
(1 − p)rB(b βt + b)2
4b
. (25)
As above, there is a positive relationship between Rt+1 and b βt: ceteris paribus,
lenders set a higher interest rate on loans the greater is the likelihood that
defaulting will occur.
Together, the expressions in (20) and (25) form a simultaneous system in
which Rt+1 and b βt are determined jointly. Under the parameter restriction
1+ρ<(1−p)rB <
1+ρ




= b − 2
s








15Details of the derivations can be found in Appendix B.
15To complete the picture, let mt denote the mass of entrepreneurs who default
(or the probability that any single entrepreneur will default). Given the






The two key parameters in this model are b (the support on the distri-
bution of βt)a n dp (the probability of successful default due to imperfect
enforceability of loan contracts). Like the previous model, the former pro-
vides a measure of uncertainty, while the latter acts as an indicator of ﬁnan-
cial market frictions. The results in (26), (27) and (28) imply the following:
βb(·) > 0 and βp(·) > 0; Rb(·) > 0 and Rp(·) > 0;a n dmb(·) > 0 and
mp(·) > 0. Thus the greater is the degree of uncertainty and/or the greater
is the imperfectness of capital markets the more likely will a borrower de-
fault, the greater will be the incidence of defaulting and the higher will be
the contractual interest rate. The eﬀects of uncertainty are again due to the
fact that a houeshold’s income from lending is a concave function of βt,b e i n g
equal to (1−p)rB(1+βt) per unit of loan if βt ∈ [−b,b β
∗
],a n d1+R∗ per unit
of loan if βt ∈ (b β
∗
,b]. The expected value of income from lending is there-
fore reduced by a mean-preserving spread of βt. In response to this, lenders
set a higher contractual interest rate which increases the probability that
defaulting will occur. The eﬀects of capital market imperfections operate
in a similar fashion. An increase in p m a k e sd e f a u l t i n gm o r ea t t r a c t i v ea n d
therefore more likely, reducing the expected income of lenders who respond
by raising the cost of borrowing.
Capital market imperfections vanish when ﬁnancial contracts are fully
enforceable. This corresponds to the case in which p =0 , implying that
an entrepreneur who defaults is sure to be caught so that defaulting will
never take place. Under such circumstances, uncertainty has no eﬀect on
the decisions of entrepreneurs, all of whom run projects (produce capital)
irrespective of the value of b.G i v e nt h i s ,t h e nt h ec o n d i t i o ni n( 2 0 )i su n d e r -
stood to be a simple bankruptcy condition, where bankruptcy occurs (does
not occur) for entrepreneurs with βt ∈ [−b,b β
∗
] (βt ∈ (b β
∗
,b]), and the term
R b βt
−b rB(1+βt)f(βt)dβt in (22) is understood to be a household’s expected re-
turn per unit of loan from seizing the income of a bankrupt capital producer.
Essentially, the model becomes the same as the previous framework when
veriﬁcation is costless.16 It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium
values of Rt+1, b βt and mt are all lower than those established above.
16With p = c =0 , (14) and (26) deliver the same value of b β
∗
, while (15) and (27) yield
the same value of R∗.
164.2 Growth
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how the contractual arrangements be-
tween borrowers and lenders is inﬂuenced by the uncertainty and enforceabil-
ity in ﬁnancial markets. In general, the greater is the degree of uncertainty
and/or the weaker is the power of enforceability the higher is the interest
rate on loans and the higher is the incidence of defaulting. We now study
the impications of these results for capital accumulation and growth.
Capital is produced by each entrepreneur who does not default on his loan
- that is, each entrepreneur for whom βt ∈ (b β
∗
,b],w h e r eb β
∗
is determined in
(26). The technology used to produce capital is given in (4). It follows that




Each entrepreneur receives a size of loan equal to the wage of the household
with which he is partnered. Thus lt = wt,w h e r ewt i sg i v e ni n( 2 ) .A c c o r d -




∗ B(1 + βt)αAktf(βt)dβt. From this, the equilibrium growth rate
of capital, g =
kt+1











T h er e s u l ti n( 2 9 )i m p l i e st h a tgb(·) < 0 and gp(·) < 0:t h a ti s ,g r o w t h
is reduced by an increase in ﬁnancial market uncertainty and/or an increase
in ﬁnancial market frictions. As we have established above, an increase in
uncertainty leads to an increase in the contractual interest rate and an in-
crease in the population of entrepreneurs who default. Equivalently, there is
a reduction in the mass of capital producers, implying a reduction in aggre-
gate capital accumulation and hence a reduction in growth. As we have also
established, a weakening in the enforceability of contracts leads similarly to
a higher interest rate on loans and a higher incidence of defaulting. With
fewer entrepreneurs producing capital, capital accumulation falls and, with
it, so does growth.
In the absence of ﬁnancial market imperfections (p =0 ), the growth
rate is simply αAB since defaulting does not occur. Rather, as indicated
earlier, all entrepreneurs produce capital and either pay back loans or go
bankrupt. Compared to the above, the growth rate in this case is higher and
is independent of b. Thus, with perfect capital markets, uncertainty has no
eﬀect on growth.
175 Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with the relationship between growth, uncer-
tainty and ﬁnance. We have studied this within the context of two distinct,
but related, models of ﬁnancial market imperfections. In both models growth
occurs endogenously through the accumulation of capital which is produced
from risky projects that require external funding. This funding is made avail-
able through mutually-agreeable ﬁnancial arrangements between borrowers
(entrepreneurs) and lenders (households), the latter of whom may alterna-
tively invest in a riskless asset that pays a safe rate of return. The terms of
these arrangements, or contracts, are determined prior to the realisation of
project outcomes, specifying the interest rate at which loans must be repayed
conditional on the uncertainty and imperfections that exist in the market.
In the ﬁrst model imperfections arise due to asymmetric information be-
tween borrowers and lenders: only the f o r m e ra r ea b l et od i r e c t l yo b s e r v e
the outcomes of projects, while the latter must spend resources on acquiring
this information. The incentive problem to which this gives rise is solved by
a contract that involves costly state veriﬁcation. Given this contract, not all
entrepreneurs ﬁnd it proﬁtable to borrow and run projects.
In the second model imperfections arise because of lack of enforceability of
contracts: borrowers have an opportunity of defaulting on debt repayments
by absconding with loans. Doing so means that loans must be consumed,
rather than invested in projects. Under the resulting contract, all entrepre-
neurs ﬁnd it proﬁtable to borrow, but not all of them choose to run projects.
Both models yield similar implications. The contractual interest rate on
loans is set as a mark-up over the risk-free rate of return that lenders’ could
earn from their alternative safe investment opportunity. The size of this
mark-up depends on the amount of income that lenders expect to lose as a
result of non-repayment of loans - an event that is more likely the higher is
the degree of uncertainty and the greater is the extent of ﬁnancial market
frictions. Accordingly, an increase in uncertainty, an increase in veriﬁcation
costs or a decrease in contract enforceability will each give rise to a higher
contractual interest rate. The eﬀect of this is to reduce the number of entre-
preneurs who undertake projects, either by weakening the incentives to take
on loans at the outset, or by strengthening the incentives to abscond with
loans. With fewer projects being operated, capital production and growth
are reduced. Signiﬁcantly, the eﬀects of uncertainty depend critically on the
existence of ﬁnancial market imperfections: absent such imperfections and
these eﬀects disappear entirely.
18Appendix A: Solution of Model I
The results in (14), (15) and (16) are derived as follows. Combining (7) and
(13) yields the quadratic equation
0=rBb β
2
t − 2(rBb− c)b βt
− [4rBb− rBb
2 − 4b(1 + ρ) − 2bc]. (A1)
Hence





4rBb[rB − (1 + ρ) − c]+c2
rB
. (A2)
As u ﬃcient condition for ruling out complex roots is that rB ≥ 1+ρ + c.
Given this, together with the fact that b βt ≤ b, the only possible solution
to (A2) is that given by b β
∗
in (14). The restriction rB ≤
1+ρ
1−b ensures that
b βt ≥− b as well. Substitution of (14) into (13) gives the expression for R∗ in
(15), while substitution of (14) into (11) gives the expression for b  
∗ in (16).
The properties of the functions β(·), R(·) and  (·) are veriﬁed as follows.
From (14), we ﬁnd that
βb(·)=1−
2[rB − (1 + ρ) − c]
p








4rBb[rB − (1 + ρ) − c]+c2
)
. (A4)




+ b)[b − b β
∗









+ b + cβc(·)
2b
. (A6)
And from (16), we obtain
 b(·)=−







+ b + cβc(·)
2b
(A8)
Under the above parameter restrictions, it is deduced that βb(·) > 0 and
βc(·) > 0, Rb(·) > 0 and Rc(·) > 0,a n d b(·) < 0 and  c(·) < 0.














Thus gb(·) < 0 and gc(·) < 0.
Appendix B: Solution of Model II
The results in (26), (27) and (28) are derived as follows. Combining (20) and
(25) gives the quadratic equation
0=( 1− p)rBb β
2
t − 2(1 − p)rBbb βt
− [4(1 − p)rBb− (1 − p)rBb
2 − 4b(1 + ρ)]. (B1)
Hence
b βt = b ± 2
s
b[(1 − p)rB − (1 + ρ)]
(1 − p)rB
. (B2)
Since b βt ≤ b, then the only possible solution is that given by b β
∗
in (26). The
restriction (1 − p)rB > 1+ρ rules out complex roots, while the restriction
(1 − p)rB ≤
1+ρ
1−b ensures that b βt ≥− b. Substitution of (26) into (25) gives
the expression for R∗ in (27), while substitution of (26) into
b βt+b
2b gives the
expression for m∗ in (28).
The properties of the functions β(·), R(·) and m(·) are veriﬁed as follows.
From (26), we ﬁnd that
βb(·)=1−
s








rB[(1 − p)rB − (1 + ρ)]
. (B4)
From (27), we have
Rb(·)=
(1 − p)rB(b β
∗












20And from (28), we obtain
mb(·)=







Under the above parameter restrictions, it is deduced that βb(·) > 0 and
βp(·) > 0, Rb(·) > 0 and Rp(·) > 0,a n dmb(·) > 0 and mp(·) > 0.






















These expressions yield gb(·) < 0 and gp(·) < 0.
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